

SOMALIA Food Security Outlook


October 2021 to May 2022

Inadequate deyr rains will likely worsen current drought, leading to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes

KEY MESSAGES

- Somalia is experiencing its third consecutive below-average rainfall season since late 2020, which is worsening the current drought. Most of southern, central, and northeastern Somalia have received little to no rainfall since June, as the October to December 2021 *deyr* rains are delayed. Weather forecasts indicate a delayed start of the rains is likely to occur in November, but this will likely be inadequate to prevent significant crop and livestock production losses. Long-range forecasts for the April to June 2022 *gu* rains also suggest elevated chances of a fourth below-average rainfall season. Somalia last experienced a four-season drought in 2016/2021, which led to severe acute food insecurity.
- Pastoralists in central, southern, and northeastern Somalia are encountering water and pasture shortages, rapidly weakening livestock body conditions, and declining livestock reproduction prospects. Many poor households lack adequate resources to cover the increased costs of protecting their herds. There are already reports of livestock deaths from starvation and disease in Jubaland and other areas, especially among cattle and sheep. Although the delayed rains will temporarily mitigate the situation, any improvement is likely to be short-lived and similar challenges are expected during the January to March *jilaal* dry season. Many pastoralists, especially poor households, will be unable to afford food and water for both their livestock and families.
- Many farmers in agropastoral and riverine areas in southern and central Somalia have already exhausted their food stocks from the preceding below-average harvests. Due to the shortened length of the *deyr* growing season, cereal crop production is expected to be in the range of 50 to 70 percent below both the 10-year average and the 1995-2020 average. As a result, food and income from agricultural labor and the January/February harvest is expected to be insufficient to prevent the occurrence of moderate to large food consumption gaps or negative livelihoods coping strategies, such as accumulating higher debt and selling off unsustainable numbers of livestock.
- Household purchasing power is rapidly declining due to the reduction of key income sources coupled with sharp increases in domestic and imported cereal prices. Due to the low supply of cereal stocks, maize and sorghum prices in many southern markets have risen 30-60 percent above the five-year average, approaching levels last observed during the 2016/2021 and 2010/2011 droughts. Imported rice prices in central and northern markets are also spiking due to high freight shipping costs, reaching 15-50 percent above average.
- Food insecurity is projected to worsen significantly through May 2022, with many households experiencing widening food consumption gaps and erosion of their coping capacity. Reduced food and milk intake, low access to clean water, and systemic non-food factors are also likely to elevate acute malnutrition and mortality levels. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to become widespread. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge in *Juba Pastoral*, *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral*, and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral* livelihood zones between November 2021 and March 2022. However, if the *deyr* rains perform more poorly than forecast, then Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would be possible in additional areas. A scale-up of humanitarian food assistance is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods.

Current food security outcomes, October 2021



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

FEWS NET and FSNAU classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

NATIONAL OVERVIEW

Current Situation

Rainfall performance: Most of Somalia is experiencing drought conditions and a delayed onset of the 2021 *deyr* rainfall season, driven by [negative Indian Ocean Dipole](#) and [La Niña](#) conditions. Nationally, Somalia's heaviest rainfall season occurs from April to June, known as the *gu*, while its secondary rainfall season, the *deyr*, occurs from October to December. Satellite-derived estimates show most of Somalia received less than 25 millimeters of rainfall from October 1st to 25th, which amounts to less than 30 percent of the 40-year average in key crop-producing areas (Figure 1). Moreover, the delayed onset of the *deyr* marks the third consecutive poor rainfall season in Somalia since late 2020, including the below-average 2020 *deyr* and below-average 2021 *gu*. The *hagaa* dry season from July to September 2021 was also exceptionally dry and hot. Only a few southern areas – including the Shabelle and Juba regions, southern Bay, and parts of Bari region – received localized light to moderate rainfall during the *hagaa*. As a result, most of northeastern, central, and southern Somalia have received little to no rainfall since May.


Due to multi-season drought, most rural households are entering the 2021 *deyr* after consecutive seasons of reduced food and income from crop and livestock production. Pasture and water resources have rapidly deteriorated due to prolonged, dry conditions since May, and off-season crop production in riverine areas between July and October was minimal. The delayed start of the *deyr* also raises the risk of low yield prospects for the *deyr* harvest in January, given that October is typically the peak rainfall month of the short, 12-week season. However, rainfall in the upper river catchments of the Ethiopian highlands is raising the water levels of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers, according to [SWALIM river monitoring station data](#), which may soon support irrigated cultivation.

Only northwestern and parts of northeastern Somalia have received significant, recent rainfall. In the northwest, which receives the *karan* rains from July to September, total rainfall reached up to 50 percent above average in *West Golis Pastoral*, *Northwest Agropastoral*, and *Guban Pastoral* livelihood zones. Heavy rains also caused flash floods during this period, improving rangeland conditions and access to water. In October, the *deyr* has also brought light to moderate rainfall to parts of Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag, and Bari regions.

Livestock production: Numerous indicators of the viability of livestock production show alarming trends in pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones in southern, central, and northeastern Somalia. In many cases, poor households are entering the season with low herd sizes, as they have not fully recovered from the large-scale losses that occurred during the 2016/2017 drought. The current livestock production cycle is also particularly vulnerable to weather hazards since the *hagaa* dry season began earlier than normal in June and persisted through October. Late October and November mark one of the biannual peak periods for livestock births. The preceding seasons of poor rainfall, coupled with the delayed onset of the *deyr* rains, mean the survival prospects of newborn kids and calves and lactating livestock can rapidly decline.


Satellite-derived data and field reports corroborate very low pasture, browse, and water availability across most southern and central livelihood zones. According to the eMODIS Normalized

Projected food security outcomes, October 2021 to January 2022



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Projected food security outcomes, February to May 2022



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

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Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), green vegetation is significantly below normal levels in southern and central Somalia, dropping below 60 percent of normal in Bay, Bakool, and Hiiraan regions (Figure 2). Dry pasture is also limited. Water shortages are widely reported in southern, central, and northeastern Somalia, reducing access to clean water for people and placing strain on poor households' daily expenditures since they must purchase water for their livestock. In locations where water is available via water trucking or boreholes, low supply and high demand are pushing water prices upward. The shortages are most acute in Nugaal, Mudug, and Lower Juba regions. For example, the cost of a 20-liter jerrycan in Xasbahalle village in Nugaal region in September was SOS 6,250, which is 47 and 105 percent higher than the same time last year and the five-year average, respectively.


These resource constraints have led to atypical livestock migration patterns in much of southern, central, and northeastern Somalia. Additionally, an influx of livestock from drought-affected areas of Kenya to southern Somalia has exacerbated local resource shortages. Longer migration and daily trekking distances in search of water and pasture strain livestock health, heighten grazing pressure on areas that still have vegetation, and increase the likelihood of localized, resource-based conflicts among pastoralists and between pastoralists and farmers. This has expanded to affect the Shabelle and Juba riverine areas, where river waters attracted significant inward migration and elevated water- and vector-borne livestock disease incidence.

Livestock body conditions generally range from below average to poor in northeastern and central Somalia, especially among lactating livestock, kids/lambs/calves, and sheep. The poorest livestock body conditions are reported in parts of *Northern Inland Pastoral* (NIP) livelihood zone and the central regions of *Coastal Deeh Pastoral*, *Addun Pastoral*, and *Hawd Pastoral* livelihood zones, where there are preliminary reports of sheep and goat deaths and miscarriages. In the south, livestock body conditions are poorest in *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone (Figure 3), pastoral areas in Gedo region, and agropastoral areas in Hiiraan region. In these areas, the health of cattle – which are more vulnerable to drought than goats and camels – has rapidly declined, and there are reports of excess livestock deaths due to starvation and disease. However, livestock health is still relatively normal in other parts of the south, where water and vegetation were available more recently.

Overall, these factors do not bode well for livestock reproduction or the availability of milk for consumption and sales, though it is still a bit early in the *deyr* season to compare birth levels and milk availability against typical levels. Conception levels observed in the preceding seasons, coupled with the impacts of drought on livestock health, suggest births in late October and November are trending low to none in *Juba Pastoral*, *Northern Inland Pastoral*, central *Addun Pastoral*, central *Coastal Deeh Pastoral*, and *Southern Inland Pastoral* livelihood zones, as well as agropastoral areas in Gedo and Hiiraan. Milk yields are both seasonally and atypically low in most of the country due to the timing of births and exacerbated by the drought impacts. The only area where cattle milk production is reportedly normal is Lower and Middle Shabelle, which received localized rains during the *hagaa*.


Livestock production conditions in northwestern Somalia stand apart from the rest of the country since end-of-season *gu* rainfall was favorable, the *karan* rains were average to above average, and the *deyr* began on time. In general, vegetation greenness is above normal levels, dry pasture is also available, and water availability is adequate. However, there are some parts

Figure 1. Cumulative rainfall shown as a percent of the 1981-2020 average according to preliminary CHIRPS data, October 1-25, 2021



Source: *Climate Hazards Center, University of California Santa Barbara*

Figure 2. Vegetation conditions shown as a percent of the 2003-2017 median according to the eMODIS NDVI, October 21-31, 2021



Source: *FEWS NET and USGS*

Figure 3. Cattle in *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone, October 2021



Source: *FEWS NET*

of Sanaag, Sool, and Togdheer regions where livestock body conditions vary from average to poor based on pasture and water availability. Normal opportunistic livestock migration is occurring within the northwest, but better resource availability has also attracted atypical in-migration from the northeast, placing extra pressure on local resources. There is also concern that conditions are conducive for desert locust breeding with the potential for damage to pasture. Nevertheless, at this time, camel, cattle, and goat milk production is seasonally normal in *Guban Pastoral*, *West Golis Pastoral*, *Northwestern Agropastoral*, and *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihoods zones due to recent or ongoing low to medium birth levels.

Crop production: Most farming households in southern and central Somalia have already endured two-to-three seasons of below-average cereal harvests on the national level due to floods during the 2020 *gu* and the ongoing, multi-season drought. According to FSNAU's estimates, maize and sorghum crop production was 15-25 percent below the 10-year average in the 2020 *gu* and 2020 *deyr* seasons and 50 percent below average in the 2021 *gu* season (Figure 4). The severity of production deficits has varied on the regional level, but the largest shortfalls occurred in marginal rainfed agricultural areas, riverine areas with poor river infrastructure, and conflict-affected areas. As a result of consecutive poor seasons, household food stocks from the *gu* harvest were generally already depleted by August, and the market supply of domestic cereals is lower than normal.


In September, regular labor demand for land preparation and dry sowing in rainfed agropastoral and riverine areas provided typical income for poor households. However, the delayed *deyr* rains subsequently impeded seed germination, and labor demand is now declining. Off-season harvesting, threshing, and storing activities are also ongoing in riverine areas. However, the off-season *gu* harvest is 33 percent below the ten-year average due to the impact of erratic rainfall, accelerated evapotranspiration, and inadequate irrigation on planting and crop development, according to FSNAU's field assessment in September. The low harvest has significantly reduced household income from cereal and cash crop sales, though some households sold plants before maturity as fodder. Meanwhile, rising river water levels are gradually improving irrigation potential, prompting planting for the main *deyr* season. However, planting activities are constrained in riverine areas of Lower Juba, where insurgents restrict farmers from opening river breakages to fill *desheks* for flood recession cultivation.

In northwestern Somalia, the maize and sorghum *karan* harvest in *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone between late October and December is also assessed to be below average. The most recent estimate from the Ministry of Agricultural Development of Somaliland projected a loss of over 60 percent compared to the 2010-2020 average as of July, but prospects have since significantly improved. Revised production estimates will be available after the FSNAU preliminary *deyr* field assessment in November. Initially, farmers planted less land from April to June as a risk mitigation measure against the desert locust infestation and poor *gu* rains. However, the favorable *karan* rains from July to September alongside desert locust control measures encouraged farmers to expand and/or re-plant crops, which partially recovered their production prospects.

Markets and trade: Several seasons of below-average crop production in Somalia have led to a very sharp increase in maize and sorghum prices across Somalia. In the south, retail prices are approaching or have already reached levels observed during the 2016/2017 and 2010/2011 droughts (Figure 5). In September, the retail price of a kilogram (kg) of red sorghum in Baidoa, Bay region, and the retail price of a kg of white maize in Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle region, was 70-100 percent above the same period of last year and 60 percent above the 2015-2020 average. Prices are highest in marginally productive or conflict-affected areas, such as Bakool, Gedo, Lower Juba, and Hiiraan regions. In Xudur, Bakool region, and Belet Hawa, Gedo region, the price of sorghum has reached SOS 19,500 and SOS 20,000 per kg, respectively, which are among the most expensive prices in the country and 50-55 higher than September of last year.

Although sorghum and maize prices are similarly high in central and northeastern Somalia, the impact on household food access is less severe due to a local preference for imported rice from international markets. However, the price of most imported staple foods such as rice, wheat flour, sugar, and vegetable oil are also trending above last year and the five-year average across Somalia. This trend is mainly due to low global sugar, wheat, and vegetable oil stocks in international source

Figure 4. Net cereal production in south-central Somalia during the *gu* and *deyr* seasons compared to the 10-year average, 2010-2021



Source: FSNAU and FEWS NET

markets and increased freight shipping costs. On average, retail prices for these products have increased by 8-28 percent compared to September 2020 and 15-50 percent above the five-year average in most markets. In the northwest, cereal imports from Ethiopia are mitigating the effect of the below-average *karan* harvest to stabilize sorghum and maize prices.


Above-average staple food prices and reduced income from agricultural labor have significantly reduced the purchasing power of labor-dependent households in southern Somalia. In Baidoa, for example, the labor-to-cereals terms of trade (the amount of cereal that a day's labor wage can purchase) were equivalent to only 10 kg of red sorghum in September, compared to 18 kg last September and the five-year average of 17 kg. Similar trends are observed in Gedo, Bakool, Lower and Middle Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions.

In general, livestock prices remain high due to low supply and high urban and export demand, which has protected the purchasing power of pastoral and agropastoral households who rely on livestock sales for income in most areas. In September, the goat-to-cereal terms of trade in central and northern regions were similar to September 2020 and near the five-year average in most monitored markets. In Iskushuban, Bari region, a local quality goat could be exchanged for 69 kg of rice compared to 67 kg last year, while in Dhusamareb, Galgaduud region, the sale of a local quality goat could pay for 41 kg of rice compared to 47 kg last year. However, above-average cereal prices are starting to outpace livestock prices in some areas that are most affected by drought or conflict. Compared to September 2020, the cattle-to-maize terms of trade dropped by 40-50 percent in Lower and Middle Juba and the goat-to-sorghum terms of trade fell by 20-35 percent in Bakool and Bay.

Conflict, insecurity, and displacement: Conflict continues to be a contributing factor to food insecurity, especially in southern and central Somalia. According to the [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data \(ACLED\) project](#) and other sources, 2021 has witnessed an increase in civil unrest and political violence related to delayed presidential elections and a 40 percent increase in attacks carried out by al-Shabaab. Armed confrontations between state and non-state actors, clashes between clan militias, and remote attacks often involve violence against civilians. These incidents drive recurrent and protracted household displacement and frequently disrupt livelihood activities and damage households' productive assets. Additionally, the tactics employed by insurgents in areas under al-Shabaab's control undermine market and trade activities, impose additional costs on households and traders via illicit taxation, and restrict humanitarian access to food insecure populations.

Conflict and insecurity have been the most significant driver of new, recurrent, and secondary population displacement in 2021, according to data on population movements and displacement collected by the UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network (Figure 6). Out of the 593,000 people that were displaced between January and September, 70 percent were displaced by conflict and insecurity, primarily in Banadir, Bay, Gedo, and Lower and Middle Shabelle regions.

Figure 5. Retail price of a kilogram of sorghum or maize in select reference markets in southern Somalia, Jan. 2010 – Sep. 2021



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Drought-induced displacement has also occurred steadily throughout the year, amounting to nearly 17 percent of total displacement. In addition to the data available on monthly displacement movements, UNHCR reports that a total of **2.97 million people were internally displaced** across Somalia as of September.

The impacts of conflict and displacement on food insecurity are protracted and widespread, but several recent events are of particular concern. In Xudur, Bakool region, and Buloburte, Hiiraan region, insurgents and allied militias have significantly intensified the use of physical and economic road blockades to restrict trade and humanitarian assistance flows between the main towns and nearby rural settlements. In Xudur, the economic siege displaced thousands of people in Bakool in April and contributed to a 30 percent month-on-month increase in the price of sorghum between April and July. In Guriceel, Galgaduud region, political conflict between the Somali

National Army and a former allied militia group resulted in the displacement of 100,000 people in and around *Hawd Pastoral* livelihood zone in October. Although **OCHA reported that displaced people started to return** as of October 31, it is assessed that the disruption to food access, WASH services, and livelihood and nutrition assistance is significant. Inter-clan conflict over natural resources has also periodically disrupted pastoral livelihoods in Guriceel, Balanbal, and Xananburo of Galgaduud region and Luuq and Dolow of Gedo region, as well as riverine livelihoods in Beledweyne, Hiiraan region.


Political and economic tensions also marked a decision by the Somaliland authorities to forcibly displace over 7,250 people were from Laas Caanood and the surrounding areas of Sool region, **according to UNHCR's PRMN and OCHA**. Nearly half of the deported people, or 3,000 of them, have already arrived in parts of Puntland such as Galkayo and Baidoa of Bay region. OCHA reports Somaliland authorities may force at least 4,400 additional people originating from the Federal State of Southwest Somalia to leave Ceerigaabo and the surrounding areas of Sanaag region in the near term. Given the forced nature of this displacement, the sudden loss of livelihoods will significantly reduce access to food and water for these displaced people.

Humanitarian food assistance: Large-scale humanitarian food assistance has continued to prevent worse food security outcomes among many rural and displaced households. According to the Somalia Food Security Cluster, an average of nearly 2 million beneficiaries received cash/voucher assistance monthly from July through September. The number of beneficiaries reached in July was the highest recorded in 2021, totaling 2.39 million, while August was the lowest, totaling 1.36 million. The level of food assistance likely mitigated the size of the food insecure population and severity of food insecurity in October at the household level, especially in the northwest. District-level distribution reports suggest food assistance delivery met the threshold for the IPC v3.0 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols, which flag locations where at least 25 percent of the population in a given area received assistance, in several locations across northwestern Somalia, parts of Bari region in the northeast, main towns in Hiiraan region, and government-controlled towns and villages in a few other parts of the south.

Current food security outcomes

Food insecurity is rapidly worsening in southern Somalia. Most agropastoral and riverine farmers have already endured three consecutive below-average harvests due to drought or floods, and many poor households finished their harvested food stocks earlier than normal in August. The delayed 2021 *deyr* rains have further suppressed income from agricultural labor, driven up cereal prices, and increased competition for off-farm income sources. The health of livestock is also declining, negatively affecting a secondary source of food and income for farmers. For southern pastoral households, the prolonged 2021 dry season has taken a severe toll and led to hunger-related livestock deaths, especially in areas that rely on cattle production and areas where the cross-border influx of livestock has placed more pressure on rangeland resources. Moreover, the impacts of recurrent drought and floods since 2016/2017 have eroded the coping capacity of both farmers and pastoralists, including their ability to purchase food on credit due to the difficulty of paying down existing debt. The recent increase in conflict and insecurity in the south, coupled with low humanitarian access to rural areas, is further exacerbating food insecurity. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are likely occurring in the worst-affected livelihood zones, including *Juba Pastoral*, *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral*, and several riverine areas along the Shabelle and Juba Rivers. In areas that are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, a rising share of the

Figure 6. Number of people displaced monthly in Somalia by reason for displacement, January 2020-September 2021



Source: data from UNHCR's Protection and Return Monitoring Network

population is likely deteriorating to Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

Similar dynamics are driving deterioration in food insecurity in central and northeastern Somalia, with the worst outcomes occurring in central *Addun Pastoral* and central and northeastern *Coastal Deeh Pastoral and Fishing* livelihood zones. While drought and rising food prices have reduced food and income sources and eroded coping capacity across these regions, pastoral households in these two livelihood zones have particularly low herd sizes, and there are reports of an increase in livestock deaths. In central *Addun*, inter-clan conflict dynamics have compounded the impacts of recurrent drought on livestock health and reproduction by limiting livestock migration options. In *Coastal Deeh*, where sheep constitute a significant share of livestock holdings and income from fishing has declined in the long term, sheep have been more vulnerable to drought impacts. Furthermore, poor households have had to increase livestock sales so that they can afford to purchase trucked water and food and pay down their debts. Low herd sizes, combined with the necessity of retaining female sheep/goats to ensure the sustainability of the herd, means that livestock sales to earn income for food and water constitutes a negative erosion of productive assets, indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

For the time being, household food insecurity is less severe in northwestern Somalia due to recent favorable rainfall and the role that sustained food assistance delivery to this area played in rebuilding livelihoods over the past couple of years, although there are some exceptions. In general, adequate rainfall desert locust control operations have supported access to food and income from livestock production – especially camels – in most pastoral areas, though households still face difficulty meeting their essential non-food needs, indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, due to high imported food prices and below-normal herd sizes in some areas. Farmers in *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone are also currently accessing food and income from the green maize harvest and recent cattle calving cycle, leading to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. However, households in *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zone – where there is only one annual harvest per year – lost a significant amount of food and income due to the below-average 2021 *gu*. In *East Golis Pastoral* livelihood zone of Sanaag, where herd sizes are low relative to neighboring areas, significant food assistance is likely preventing food consumption gaps and enabling Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

Many displaced and poor urban households in IDP settlements and main towns are also facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, based on the results of the 2021 post-gu household survey conducted by FSNAU and partners in July/August. Significant food assistance is likely mitigating the worse outcomes in Qardho IDP settlement in the northeast, indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2!). Displaced people face more difficulty accessing income-earning opportunities due to the lack of local social networks, and levels of acute malnutrition are chronically high due to disease and inadequate sanitation in IDP settlements. Surging cereal prices are placing increased strain on both displaced and poor urban households, who typically spend a high proportion of their income on food expenditures. The impact of multiple shocks – including drought, floods, desert locust, and COVID-19 – over the last several seasons has also diminished the availability of cash or in-kind gifts from their social networks. Recent, large-scale displacement from LaasCaanoob, Ceerigaabo, and Guriceel are of particularly high concern due to the effect of a sudden loss of livelihood on household food access.

Based on the results of 35 SMART surveys conducted in June/July 2021 by FSNAU and partners, 1.2 million children under the age of five are projected to be acutely malnourished by the end of 2021, with nearly 213,400 of them severely malnourished. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) measured by weight-for-height z-score (WHZ) or middle upper arm circumference (MUAC) is assessed to be Serious (GAM WHZ 10-14.9 percent) in most southern, central, and northeastern areas, as well as *Northwestern Agropastoral* and *West Golis Pastoral* livelihood zones in northwestern Somalia. However, due to elevated disease incidence (including measles and AWD) and reduced food intake, more severe Critical (GAM WHZ 15-29.9 percent) levels are likely in Banadir, Baidoa, and Galkacyo IDP settlements; riverine areas; agropastoral and pastoral areas in Bay, Bakool, and Hiiraan; and *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone. Chronically high acute malnutrition levels across Somalia are driven by multiple factors, including poor access to clean water and sanitation, low immunization, low vitamin-A supplementation, and low coverage of health and nutrition services. Only a few areas in the northwest and northeast likely have lower Alert (GAM WHZ 5-9.9 percent) levels, mainly due to health and nutrition interventions.

Assumptions


The most likely scenario from October 2021 to May 2022 is based on the following national-level assumptions:

- Based on current rainfall, median performance in analog years with negative Indian Ocean Dipole and La Niña conditions, and the NMME, WMO, and ECMWF ensemble forecast models, FEWS NET's science partners forecast that cumulative rainfall in the 2021 *deyr* season will most likely be over 40 percent below-average in southern and central Somalia. In northern Somalia, rainfall performance is forecast to be mixed, with deficits occurring in *Hawd Pastoral* livelihood zone and parts of the northeast. Currently, the *deyr* rains are forecast to be fully established in November. However, close

monitoring is required as the timing of rainfall onset and magnitude of seasonal rainfall deficits are difficult to predict precisely.

- Based on the NMME precipitation anomaly forecast, FEWS NET's science partners forecast the December/January *xays* showers in *Guban Pastoral* livelihood zone will most likely be near average with hotter-than-normal temperatures.
- Due to below-average *deyr* rainfall, drought conditions will likely persist and worsen during the January-March *jilaal* dry season, especially in southern and central Somalia. However, the severity of dry conditions is likely to be near normal in *Northwestern Agropastoral* and *West Golis Pastoral* livelihood zones, which received average *karan* rainfall this year.
- Based on the analysis of historical analog years with similar climatic conditions, FEWS NET's science partners forecast that the transition from La Niña to ENSO neutral conditions in early 2022 is most likely to result in below-average rainfall during the April to June 2022 *gu* rainfall season. However, uncertainty exists given the long-term nature of this forecast.
- The *deyr* rains in northern Somalia are currently conducive to desert locust breeding, and, according to [FAO's Desert Locust Watch](#), there is still a risk that some swarms in northeastern Ethiopia, the Gulf states, or western Asia could migrate to northern Somalia to breed. However, dry conditions in northeastern Ethiopia and ongoing aerial control operations in northern Somalia will likely lower the scale of damage to green pasture and crops compared to last year.
- The *deyr* cereal harvest in southern agropastoral areas in January will be significantly below average due to delayed, below-average rainfall and pest incidence. Based on net cereal production in past poor rainfall seasons, FSNAU and FEWS NET's preliminary projection is that the harvest will be 50-70 percent below the 10-year and 1995-2020 averages. Some farmers may plant drought-tolerant cash crops (e.g., sesame, cowpeas) to offset cereal losses, but the cash crop harvest is also likely to be below average. As a result, labor demand for weeding and harvesting will most likely be low through February, with a slight recovery for land preparation and planting is expected in March/April for the *gu* season.
- The main *deyr* cereal harvest in riverine areas and the off-season *deyr* harvest in March/April will most likely be below average due to locally poor rainfall, the likelihood of crop damage from seasonal floods, and the likelihood that a hotter-than-normal *jilaal* dry season will reduce flood recession cultivation. The risk of flooding is driven by unrepaired river breakages and weak river embankments, which can cause flooding even during a poor rainfall season.
- Although livestock body conditions are expected to improve in November/December following the delayed onset of *deyr* rainfall, very dry conditions during the *jilaal* dry season are expected to significantly affect livestock health from January until the onset of the *gu* rains in April, especially in south-central Somalia. Water, pasture, and browse shortages will most likely be significant and widespread during this period, limiting the utility of livestock migration and driving up the cost of trucked water. In the worst-affected areas, these factors will likely elevate livestock mortality.
- Based on current livestock herd sizes, breeding cycles, and expected drought impacts, medium to low levels of goat and sheep kidding/lambing are anticipated to peak in November and in April/May (in northern Somalia, lambing only occurs in the *gu*). Meanwhile, a low to medium level of camel and cattle calving is expected during the *deyr* in northern Somalia, while only low cattle and camel calving is expected in south/central Somalia during the *deyr*. In southern and central areas where water and pasture/browse shortages are acute, there is an elevated likelihood of livestock miscarriages and an elevated likelihood that pastoralists will cull young livestock to preserve the health of female livestock.
- Anticipated rainfall and livestock births are expected to support a seasonal increase in milk availability between October and January and in April/May, though production levels will vary. Milk production will likely be near average in livelihood zones where herd sizes are near normal levels and in northern livelihood zones that received *karan* and timely *deyr* rains. Milk production will likely be at least moderately below average in areas with low herd sizes, elevated livestock mortality, or high levels of livestock migration, especially in parts of southern and central Somalia, including riverine areas.
- Based on FEWS NET's price analysis for the main reference markets of Baidoa and Qoryoley, retail maize and sorghum

Figure 7. Observed and projected retail price of red sorghum in Baidoa, Bay region, May 2021 – May 2022 compared to the 2016-2020 average



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

prices – the main staple foods produced in the south – are projected to remain well above the five-year average through May 2022 due to low market supply. In Baidoa, sorghum is projected to range from 55 to 75 percent above average, peaking at around 12,445 SOS (USD 0.50) in May 2022 (Figure 7). In Qoryoley, maize is projected to range from 72-100 percent above average, peaking in May 2022 at around 14,000 SOS (USD 0.56). In northern and central Somalia, sorghum prices are also expected to remain above average, though the below-average *karan* harvest in the northwest and some cross-border imports from the Somali region of Ethiopia are expected to mitigate the severity of these price increases.

- Based on global supply levels and high freight shipping costs, the imported food prices – including rice, the main staple food in central and northern Somalia – are likely to remain moderately above the five-year average.
- According to FEWS NET’s integrated analysis, the agricultural daily labor wage is likely to remain below average in most agropastoral areas through May 2022, driven by the impact of poor rainfall on labor demand for weeding and harvesting. FEWS NET projects that the labor wage in Bur Hakaba of Bay, for example, will drop by as much as 25 percent below the five-average. At the onset of the *deyr* and *gu* rains, opportunities for work in urban areas will also periodically be constrained by seasonal declines in road accessibility and construction/market activity.
- The health and saleability of individual livestock will continue to limit household income from livestock sales, even though retail livestock prices – especially goats – are expected to remain favorable due to low market supply, high urban and export demand, and a seasonal increase in demand during *Ramadan* (April 2022). Based on FEWS NET’s price analysis for the reference markets of Galkacyo, Burao, and Baidoa through December 2021, the price of a local goat is projected to range from 20 to 50 percent above average in northeastern and central Somalia and 10 to 20 percent above average in northwestern and southern Somalia. In 2022, prices will decline during the dry season and then rise after March.
- Household purchasing power measured by the labor-to-cereal terms of trade (ToT) is expected to trend below average through May 2022, driven by low labor demand and high cereal prices. In most central and northern areas, the goat-to-rice ToT is expected to be near average, as above-average goat prices are expected to keep pace with above-average cereal prices. However, southern markets with very high maize and sorghum prices will see a decline in the goat-to-cereals ToT. Meanwhile, households that sell cattle for income are likely to see a decline in the cattle-to-cereal ToT, given that the retail cattle price is more sensitive to the impact of drought and insecurity on supply/demand dynamics.
- Given current tensions surrounding the delayed presidential election, civil unrest and political violence are likely to continue to rise into and beyond November depending on the length of time the election is further delayed, or if the outcome of an eventual vote is not considered credible. Related violence is likely to be high in opposition areas such as the state capitals of Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and Puntland. In Hirshabelle and Gedo, there is a risk that armed conflict among the Somali national army (SNA) forces, aligned with clan militias, could create a security vacuum into which al-Shabaab would move to capture more land, resulting in population displacement and loss of assets and lives.
- Al-Shabaab will likely continue to carry out sporadic attacks in Mogadishu and throughout south-central Somalia at least at levels observed in 2021, with the goal of disrupting election-related activities and the anticipated transition of AMISOM forces to the new African Union security mission by December 2021. Al-Shabaab will likely also continue to restrict humanitarian access and hinder general population movement and trade using illegal roadblocks.
- According to information from the Somalia Food Security Cluster and OCHA, funding and district-level plans for humanitarian food assistance delivery have not been fully secured or confirmed. Based on this information, this scenario assumes no food assistance delivery will occur from November through May.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to become widespread across Somalia through May 2022, while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge in Juba Pastoral, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral, and Coastal Deeh Pastoral livelihood zones between November 2021 and March 2022. Without planned and funded humanitarian food assistance, the likelihood of a three-to-four season drought in the context of protracted conflict will lead to significant reductions in household food and income sources, erode resilience and coping capacity, and elevate acute malnutrition and mortality levels. Rising acute malnutrition is of particular concern in Bay, Hiiraan, and Bakool regions; riverine areas; Juba Pastoral livelihood zone; and IDP settlements in Baidoa, Mogadishu, and Galkacyo, where Critical (GAM WHZ 15-29.9 percent) levels are already expected. These projected food security outcomes are contingent on the forecast that rainfall in November and December will partially regenerate rangeland resources and support crop germination and development, particularly in Somalia’s more productive, rainfed areas (western Bay, Lower Shabelle, and Middle Shabelle regions). However, the season

requires close monitoring since it is difficult to precisely forecast rainfall distribution and the magnitude of rainfall deficits. If the *deyr* rains perform more poorly than forecast, then food security outcomes will likely be more severe than projected. Past trends in Somalia show that food insecurity can rapidly worsen due to rainfall failure, and the current surge in maize and sorghum prices and increase in livestock mortality demonstrate the potential that a more severe outlook could materialize.

In most pastoral areas, poor pastoral households will likely have food consumption gaps or use livelihood coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to rise in areas of high concern, such as central *Addun Pastoral*, *Hawd Pastoral*, *Northern Inland Pastoral*, and *East Golis Pastoral* of Sanaag livelihood zones. In the worst-affected areas of *Juba Pastoral* and *Coastal Deeh Pastoral* livelihood zones, the population threshold for Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will likely be reached between November and March. The anticipated *deyr* rains are expected to be minimally adequate to support the livestock birth and milk production cycle and mitigate excess livestock mortality until January. However, the subsequent dry season from January to March is expected to bring water shortages and low pasture and browse availability. Consequently, it will be difficult for poor pastoral households to afford food and water for both their livestock and their families. Many pastoralists will face difficult coping decisions such as selling off their livestock at lower values, migrating longer distances that risk further weakening their livestock, or culling young livestock to preserve the health of mothers. Household purchasing capacity is expected to be lowest and/or excess livestock mortality is expected to be highest in areas where herd sizes are already low, herds are mainly composed of cattle or sheep (which are more vulnerable to drought-induced starvation or disease), or conflict restricts market access.

In most rainfed agropastoral areas and irrigated riverine areas in south-central Somalia, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected. Moreover, the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to rise in marginal agricultural areas, areas with higher levels of conflict, and riverine areas with inadequate irrigation infrastructure, such as *Southern Rainfed Agropastoral* livelihood zone in the Juba regions and riverine areas in Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan, Lower and Middle Juba, and Gedo. In the worst-affected area of *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral* livelihood zone, the population threshold for Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will most likely be reached between February and May. Only a few areas will likely remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2), either due to locally better crop production prospects or locally higher livestock holdings. The anticipated *deyr* rains are expected to occur too late to permit full recovery of crop production prospects due to the short length of the growing season. Historical trends suggest cereal and cash crop production will be lowest in marginal agricultural areas. Meanwhile, rising river water levels suggest farmers in riverine areas will have a longer period of crop cultivation but still experience significant crop losses due to the poor start of the season, localized floods, and faster rate of evapotranspiration during the dry season. Diminished food stocks, labor income, and crop sales income from the 2021 *deyr* season will have a significant impact on most farming households, who are facing their third or fourth consecutive poor production season. Poor households will be more severely affected given that they have smaller plots and low livestock holdings to sell, and other income-earning opportunities (e.g., off-farm labor, fishing) are inadequate to cover the cost of exorbitant food prices. These factors will be compounded by the impacts of conflict and insecurity on livelihood activities and trade.

In rainfed agropastoral areas in northwestern Somalia, food security outcomes will evolve differently than other agropastoral areas. In *Togdheer Agropastoral* livelihood zone, which has only one annual *gu* harvest in July/August, livestock production and labor income will likely remain inadequate to cover the cost of above-average food prices. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to persist until the next *gu* harvest, with a rising number of households likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In *Northwestern Agropastoral* livelihood zone, the below-average *karan* harvest supplemented by seasonal cow milk and fodder production is expected to sustain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes until approximately February. After these food and income sources are depleted, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected from February until the next *gu* harvest. In addition to below-average 2021 harvests, cattle calving during the 2022 *gu* season is expected to be below normal due to the timing of the reproduction cycle. The reduction in these two major income sources means poor households will be unable to cover the cost of above-average cereal prices without eroding their cattle holdings, despite a slight boost in labor income from land preparation and planting for the *gu* crop production season in March/April.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across Somalia's 14 largest IDP settlements, and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely in Somalia's main urban centers. Displaced households and poor urban households are expected to have difficulty earning sufficient income to cover their minimum food needs due to rising staple food prices. Both populations have limited income sources and spend a high share of their income on food, rendering them vulnerable to price shocks. In addition, many IDP households rely on assistance from urban and rural kin and humanitarian food assistance. Without confirmed food assistance in the projection period, coupled with a reduced ability of kin to provide assistance during a period of drought and high food prices, then IDP households are at risk of widening food consumption gaps.

Events that Might Change the Outlook


Table 1. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario.

Area	Event	Impact on food security outcomes
<i>Southern and central Somalia</i>	Failure of the <i>deyr</i> rainfall season, with little to no rainfall in November /December	Agropastoral areas would likely experience a significantly below average to failed <i>deyr</i> harvest due to severe crop moisture stress, as farmers lack the resources to salvage their losses with drought-resistant crops. Riverine areas with inadequate irrigation infrastructure would also have lower harvests. In pastoral areas, deterioration in livestock health would be more widespread and more severe, leading to wider occurrences of excess mortality between November and April with limited livestock conceptions for the next season. A significant increase in drought-related destitution and displacement would be likely, especially among pastoralists. An increase in the severity of food security and size of the acutely food insecure population would be likely, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would be possible in additional areas, especially during January-March <i>jilaal</i> dry season.
<i>National</i>	Average rainfall during the April to June 2022 <i>gu</i> season	The timing of an average 2022 <i>gu</i> rainfall season would occur too late to significantly improve projected food security outcomes through May, as the negative impacts of the below-average <i>deyr</i> season would have already manifested in significant food and income losses. However, it would likely begin to gradually improve food security conditions by replenishing pasture and water resources, supporting livestock conceptions for the 2022 <i>deyr</i> season, and boosting agricultural labor demand for the 2022 <i>gu</i> . Since household herd sizes would still be low and the <i>gu</i> harvest would not occur until July/August, significant emergency food assistance would still be required to prevent Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. However, the rains would better support livelihoods interventions such as seed/input distributions or livestock restocking.
<i>Southern and central Somalia</i>	Prolonged delays to the presidential election or election outcomes that lead to higher levels of conflict	Escalating political tensions and violence would primarily impact Mogadishu, but also affect other opposition areas in southern and central Somalia. Increased displacement, casualties, loss of livelihood assets, market and trade disruptions, and lapses in the provision of security services would be likely, compounding the impacts of concurrent drought. In a worst-case scenario, all markets, Mogadishu port, and airports would be closed, food prices would escalate, and trade movements between the port town and southern regions would be suspended. Under this scenario, significant population movement/displacement out of Mogadishu to other areas of relative safety is likely. A significant increase in the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be expected.

AREAS OF CONCERN

Juba Pastoral (Cattle and Goats) livelihood zone (Figure 8)*Current Situation*

Drought conditions in southern Somalia have increased atypical migration patterns, driven up the costs of maintaining livestock, and led to an increase in livestock sales and mortality. These impacts are particularly acute in *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone, where pastoralists rely heavily on cattle production for their livelihood. Typically, the local climatology is much wetter than Somalia's central and northern areas, but the occurrence of dry conditions can quickly weaken cattle. Local competition for resources within *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone and nearby Juba riverine areas is exacerbated by the influx of livestock from drought-affected areas of Kenya and Somalia's Gedo region. The increased grazing pressure quickly exhausted local and riverine pastures, leaving pastoralists with few viable options. Some have stayed in riverine areas to access free water, but must manage the cost of fodder for livestock feed and the risk of increased water- and vector-borne disease incidence (e.g., tsetse fly) that are endemic to riverine areas. Others have opted to migrate their livestock away from riverine areas to search for dry pasture but must manage the costs of purchasing water for their livestock from boreholes. On average, the price of a 200-liter (53-gallon) drum of water in Lower and Middle Juba was SOS 33,687 in September, which is 22 and

Figure 8. Area of concern reference map, *Juba Pastoral* livelihood zone

Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

10 percent higher than the same time last year and the five-year average, respectively. In Bu'ale, the price has reached SOS 42,500, which is 42 percent above the five-year average and the highest recorded since 2010.

As a result, many poor households cannot afford to purchase water, fodder, and other inputs for their herds and also purchase enough food for their families. Some pastoralists have coped by selling off more of their livestock than usual to obtain income and preserve their remaining holdings. Others missed the opportunity to sell before cattle body conditions were too weak for sale. There are reports of excess livestock mortality due to starvation and disease, especially among very young calves and lambs, lactating animals, and elderly animals. Quantitative estimates are currently unavailable, and it is likely that reports include the losses of cattle and sheep that migrated long distances to the livelihood zone from other areas. The poor health and loss of livestock not only diminishes income from livestock sales but also reduces food and income from milk production.

The situation is exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between al-Shabaab and the local Jubaland authority, not only due to attacks but also due to the insurgents' tactics of controlling trade routes and issuing double taxation on traded commodities. Cross-border exports of cattle through Doblei border-cross point from Somalia to Garissa, Kenya, had already drastically declined since 2011 (Figure 9). Now, new trade restrictions imposed by al-Shabaab and the lack of pasture and water in holding grounds and along market routes have further disrupted the cattle trade, restricting sales to small markets under the insurgents' control and preventing cattle trade in the urban centers Afmadow and Doblei. As a result, the average price of a local quality cow/bull in monitored markets in Lower and Middle Juba in September 2021 has declined to SOS 3,212,500 per head, which is nearly 45 and 20 percent below the same time last year and the five-year average, respectively.

The loss of livestock, increased expenses on livestock inputs, a significant reduction in income from livestock production, and above-average cereal prices have rapidly worsened food insecurity. Household purchasing power, measured by the amount of maize that can be purchased with the sale of a cow/bull, has declined significantly. In September, the average price of maize in monitored markets in Lower and Middle Juba reached SOS 13,528 per kg, which is over 10 and 40 percent higher than September 2020 and the five-year average, respectively. As a result, the sale of a local quality cow/bull could fetch 237 kg of maize, which is 40-50 below last year and the five-year average. Given these factors, most poor and some middle wealth group households have food consumption gaps indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Reduced food intake and poor access to clean water is likely driving an increase in acute malnutrition levels, which were already Critical (MUAC <12.5 cm) due to a high morbidity rate and chronic non-food issues, according to screenings conducted by FSNAU and partners in June/July 2021.

Assumptions


In addition to the national assumptions on pages 8-9, the following assumptions are made for this livelihood zone:

- Due to the severity of pasture and water deficits and disease incidence, livestock body conditions are expected to remain poorer than other parts of Somalia, leading to excess livestock mortality. Poor health and declining herd sizes will suppress livestock conception and births to low levels throughout the projection period, eroding household livestock holdings.
- Household purchasing power measured by the cattle-to-cereal or goat-to-maize terms of trade (ToT) is expected to be significantly below average, driven by the impact of drought, trade restrictions, and double taxation on below-average livestock prices and above-average cereal prices.
- For the worst-affected poor households, the loss of livestock holdings will render their livelihood unsustainable. Drought-induced displacement is expected as pastoralists move to displacement camps to seek humanitarian assistance.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Juba Pastoral livelihood zone is expected to deteriorate from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in late 2021, as an increasing number of households face widening food consumption gaps, poor access to clean water, and rising acute malnutrition within Critical (MUAC <12.5 cm) levels. Although the forecast of *deyr* rainfall in November/December may temporarily mitigate the severity of drought, the high local concentration of livestock and the current degree of deterioration in livestock health suggest it will be inadequate to prevent a significant reduction in livestock holdings during the January-

Figure 9. Cross-border exports of cattle through Doblei border-crossing point to Garissa, Kenya, 2011-2020



Source: FEWS NET

March dry season. Livestock losses are expected to include death related to starvation and disease and low to no births. In terms of comparison to past trends, the 2016/2017 La Niña drought led to the death of approximately 6 of every 20 cattle. Additionally, income from livestock sales will be constrained by both the declining quality and value of livestock for sale and the restrictions on local trade. With limited saleable livestock and little to no milk production, household income will be significantly inadequate to cover the cost of above-average maize prices. Faced with the prospect of large food consumption gaps and loss of their livelihood, some households will likely migrate to displacement sites in search of humanitarian assistance.

Sorghum High Potential and Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones of Bay and Bakool regions (Figure 10)

Current Situation


In Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and Bay Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones, satellite-derived data show the onset of *deyr* rainfall is delayed by at least 15 days, but field reports suggest light to moderate rainfall has occurred. At this time of year, most poor households typically rely on a mix of their food stocks from the *gu* harvest and food purchased from the market to cover their minimum food needs, financed by income from agricultural labor, supplementary livestock sales, gifts from the community, and store credit or loans. However, field reports suggest poor households in high potential areas only harvested enough food stocks from the *gu* harvest in July to last up to 1 month, while poor households in low potential areas had no carryover stocks at all. Furthermore, poor households in both low and high potential areas lost a significant amount of their annual income due to low agricultural labor demand. As a result, they experienced an early start to the main agricultural lean season by August.

Although demand rebounded for land preparation and planting for the 2021 *deyr* in September, several consecutive below-average crop production seasons have driven labor wages to below-average levels, making it increasingly difficult to compensate for rising staple foods prices, which are at record-high levels. In rural areas of Bay, the labor wage declined by 7-35 percent below the five-year average in September (Figure 11). Crop production deficits and the impact of insecurity on local trade flows between Bay and Bakool have simultaneously pushed the price of red sorghum up to SOS 10,000/kg in Baidoa in September, which was 80 percent and 62 percent higher than last year and the five-year average, respectively. Food prices are even higher in Bakool, where the price of sorghum in Xudur has approached 20,000 SOS/kg, which is 56 percent above last year and nearly 50 percent above the five-year average. As a result, a day's labor wage can only purchase 10 kg of sorghum in Baidoa compared to 18 kg last year and just four kilograms of sorghum in Xudur, which is among the lowest terms of trade in Somalia.

The delay of the *deyr* rains has also significantly affected supplementary food and income from livestock production. Cattle body conditions are poor and cattle milk production is still seasonally low, while high cereal prices have driven down the goat-to-sorghum terms of trade. Although goat prices still range from 20-30 percent above the five-year average, the goat-to-sorghum terms of trade have fallen by 20-35 percent below last year and 17-30 below the average in Wajid and Xudur in Bakool (66 kg/goat) and Baidoa in Bay (126 kg/goat). Additionally, the expandability of this coping strategy is limited due to low goat herd sizes among poor households, who prioritize seeking out agricultural labor opportunities and have seen their goat herds decline from 8-10 goats to 6-8 goats on average.


Given inadequate sources of food and income, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely occurring in both livelihood zones. The

Figure 10. Area of concern reference map, Sorghum High Potential and Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones of Bay and Bakool regions



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Figure 11. Difference in the value of the agricultural labor wage in September 2021 compared to the 2015-2020 average



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

impact of weather shocks on food security are further exacerbated by conflict and insecurity, especially in Bakool, where the insurgents continue to restrict the movement of people and goods in Wajid and Hudur districts. Households are likely resorting to purchasing food on credit, leading to an increase in debt levels that already totaled 86-98 USD on average in July/August. Drought-related displacement is occurring at low levels, indicative of very limited livelihood options among the worst-off households. Although food assistance reached about 16 percent of the population in Bay and Bakool per month from July to September, this assistance typically does not reach much of rural populations due to restrictions imposed by insurgents. Reduced food intake and limited access to safe water and sanitation, coupled with chronic health and nutrition issues such as poor infant and young child feeding practices, are likely also driving an increase in acute malnutrition levels. Critical (GAM WHZ 15-29.9 percent) levels were projected to occur by September based on the analysis of SMART survey data collected in Bay region in July, though data were not collected in Bakool due to ongoing conflict and insecurity.

Assumptions

In addition to the national assumptions on pages 8-9, the following assumptions are made for this livelihood zone:

- The forecast of delayed *deyr* rainfall is expected to be minimally adequate for crop germination, but yield losses are expected to be significant due to inadequate total rainfall and the shortened growing season. Historical trends indicate poor rainfall will lead to worse crop yield prospects in low potential agricultural areas compared to high potential agricultural areas due to differences in total cumulative rainfall, soil fertility, and financial capacity to purchase inputs.
- As demonstrated by the siege of Xudur, Bakool region is likely to be more affected by conflict and insecurity, including the insurgents' tactics of controlling population movements, market functioning and trade flows, and humanitarian access.
- Household purchasing power is expected to be significantly suppressed by high staple food prices and the below-average labor wage. Despite above-average goat prices, high food prices will likely also suppress the goat-to-cereals terms of trade. For example, in Baidoa, sorghum is projected to range from 55 to 75 percent above average, peaking at around 12,445 SOS (USD 0.50) in May 2022, a peak last observed during early 2011 during the 2010/2011 drought.
- The significant loss of food and income from consecutive below-average crop production seasons, including the 2021 *gu* and 2021 *deyr*, is likely to lead to an increase in drought-related population movement to major towns in search of livelihood opportunities, social support, and humanitarian assistance, peaking between November and March.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Household coping capacity is already eroded due to multiple below-average crop production seasons since the 2020 *gu*, especially in low potential areas where households have fewer productive assets and lower access to social support. During the 2021 *deyr*, which overlaps the secondary agricultural lean season, poor households will be unable to compensate for the loss of agricultural labor income and very high cereal prices with livestock sales or other typical income sources. In addition, households will likely also have low cattle milk production and receive fewer gifts from an already-strained social support system. In January, the *deyr* harvest is not expected to meaningfully alleviate food insecurity, as food stocks will likely last less than one month and cereal prices will likely remain quite high. As a result, poor households are expected to encounter an early start to the main agricultural lean season in 2022, and the protracted reduction in food and income is expected to result in widening food consumption gaps. In low potential areas, many poor households are highly likely to liquidate their livestock herds, maximize their ability to purchase food on credit, and move to other towns to search for food and income. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected in *Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral* livelihood zone by March. In *Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral* livelihood zone, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Addun Pastoral livelihood zone in central Somalia (Figure 12)

Current Situation

Central *Addun Pastoral* livelihood zone has received little to no rainfall since May, leading to inadequate pasture, browse, and water availability for goat and camel production, which is the main source of food and income in this area. Shallow wells, communal dams, and private concrete water reservoirs (*berkads*) are dry, and trucked water is currently the only water source. In September, one drum of water in Galkacyo reached SOS 32,000, which is a 14 percent and 45 percent increase from September 2020 and the five-year average, respectively. Although goats and camels can withstand dry conditions for longer periods than cattle or sheep, the protracted dry season has taken its toll. Migration options are few, exacerbated by inter-clan conflict, and there are reports of atypical deaths among young, lactating, or elderly livestock.

Household herd sizes are also significantly below normal, limiting the number of livestock available for sale. Poor households

reported 31 goats/sheep on average in July compared to 57 on average in 2015. Kidding and lambing prospects during the *deyr* are medium to low due to the impact of the below-average *gu* rains on reproduction. Similarly, camel calving prospects are limited due to low conceptions last year. For the average poor household, the size of their herd has been stagnant since 2019. As a result, milk production is below normal.

Low livestock holdings continue to be the main limiting factor for food access among poor households, even though prevailing livestock prices are broadly favorable. However, favorable livestock prices are starting to lose pace against above-average imported rice and local sorghum prices, which is lowering household purchasing power compared to earlier this year. A local quality goat sale can fetch 41 kg of rice in Dhusamareb, Galgaduud region, and 105 kg in Galkacyo, Mudug region. These terms of trade are 13 and 9 percent lower than last year and the five-year average, respectively, in Dhusamareb. In Galkacyo, the terms of trade are 8 percent lower than last year but still 19 percent above the five-year average.

As a result of low income from livestock production, poor households depend on limited credit, loans, gifts, and some humanitarian food assistance to purchase food. However, they likely have food consumption gaps as the income sources are inadequate to compensate for above-average food prices. Poor households report high and rising debt levels, which were equivalent to an average of USD 440 during the post-*gu* assessment in July and significantly higher than typical debt levels of USD 100-200. This level of debt is roughly equivalent to the value of eight to twelve goats to repay fully. Access to humanitarian food assistance in central *Addun Pastoral* livelihood zone is also significantly restricted. Although humanitarian partners can reach the main villages, there are reports that insurgents confiscate or punish those who openly acknowledge receiving food aid. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely occurring. Based on the SMART survey conducted in July, a Serious (GAM WHZ 10-14.9 percent) level of acute malnutrition is expected due to both food and non-food drivers.

Assumptions


In addition to the national assumptions on pages 8-9, the following assumptions are made for this livelihood zone:

- Forecast *deyr* rainfall is expected to partially regenerate pasture and water resources, reducing the occurrence of livestock mortality. However, pasture and water conditions are expected to deteriorate during the *jilaal* dry season, increasing pressure on grazing resources and increasing the use of trucked water for livestock again. Inter-clan conflict will likely continue to restrict livestock migration options to more distant areas in search of pasture and water.
- Based on FEWS NET's livestock herd dynamics model, herd sizes are expected to stagnate at 50 percent below baseline levels. This projection is driven by medium to low births, the sale of goats for income to purchase food, the sale of goats to pay down accumulated debts, and the gift of at least one goat from the *zakat* tradition.
- Although high goat prices are expected to mitigate the negative effect of above-average rice prices on the goat-to-rice terms of trade, household purchasing capacity will remain restricted. It would require 8-10 goat sales to fully cover the food needs for the average household size, but this level of sales would endanger the sustainability of their livelihoods.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected throughout the scenario period, with an increase in the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the 2022 *jilaal* dry season. As the *deyr* rains become established, expected goat and sheep births, milk production, and some mature sheep and goats for sale (roughly 2-3 heads) will offer a source of food and income, partially relieve debt, and to some extent open access to credit purchase. However, these sales will offset the potential for herd growth from births. Shop owners may limit the provision of credit to some households, given that very few pastoralists will own enough livestock to pay down their debts. Milk consumption will also remain atypically low due to limited births. Other income sources, such as off-farm labor, self-employment, and social support, are expected to be inadequate to compensate for the reduction in livestock production. By early 2022, pasture and water shortages during the *jilaal* will place further pressure on household income and expenditures. While households will still likely be able to sell some animals, the resulting decline in herd sizes would further erode the sustainability of their livelihoods. As a result, food consumption gaps are likely to persist until at least the start of the 2022 *gu* rains, accompanied by deterioration in acute malnutrition levels.

Figure 12. Area of concern reference map, central *Addun Pastoral* livelihood zone




Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

MOST LIKELY FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES AND AREAS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE*


Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.0 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian assistance are being/are expected to be provided. ☐ indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance (HFA). ☐ indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through HFA. This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed humanitarian assistance.

Current, October 2020




Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Projected food security outcomes, October 2020 to January 2022



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

Projected food security outcomes, February to May 2022



Source: FEWS NET and FSNAU

FEWS NET and FSNAU classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

FEWS NET and FSNAU: Somalia Food Security Outlook October 2021 to May 2022: Inadequate deyr rains will likely intensify current drought, leading to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, 2021.

ABOUT SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. [Learn more here.](#)